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Abstract—Identity-based attacks serve as the basis of an 
intruder's attempt to launch security infringements in mobile 
health monitoring scenarios. Wireless channel perturbations due 
to the presence of human body are a relative phenomenon 
depending heavily on the subject's dielectric properties. A new 
Body-Centric Signature Authorization (B-CSAI) approach based 
on time-frequency domain characteristics was proposed. This 
method utilizes multiple millimeter wave bands of 27-28 GHz, 
29-30 GHz, and 31-32 GHz, thereby enhancing the security in 
body-centric communications exploiting benefits of subject 
specific channel signature. The proposed bornprint method is 
based on the intrinsic identity related time-frequency domain 
information, which generated by the user's natural hand motion 
signature and resulting creeping waves and space waves. It can 
meet the unconditional keyless authorization requirements. A 
detailed measurement campaign considering radiation efficiency 
( ( ) . , . , .25 8 24 7 26 4dBη = − − − ), pathloss exponent, and shadowing 
factor in three millimeter wave bands, using six human subjects 
confirm the usability and efficiency of the proposed approach. 
This also shows that there is a wide space for realizing security 
from physical mechanisms.  
 
Index Terms—Mobile health, body-centric communications, 
signature authorization, subject specific, bornprint.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
OWADAYS health service architecture based on the core 
of medical institutions faces enormous challenges from 
new social changes [1]. Ubiquitous mobile health, the intention 
to join mobile communication technology into the health 
service architecture [2], and patient-centric based precision 
medicine [3], has become the main focus of research 
community. Implantable and wearable body centric medical 
devices are expected to improve the quality of medical 
diagnostics, but provide convenience while increasing security 
risks [4] [5]. Pioneer work in [6], proposed a security, 
lightweight, anti-denial-of-service upper security architecture. 
But also pointed out, for wireless body area networks 
deployment, or body-centric devices distribution, many 
protocols have emerged, but they all focus on protocol 
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reliability and ignore security vulnerabilities. Traditional 
security solutions are impractical for a variety of emerging 
networks, especially the exponentially growing handheld 
applications, where most of their lightweight computing power 
comes from wireless devices [4] [7].  
Traditionally, the security of wireless networks has been 
considered as a problem independent of the transmission of 
physical radio waves. However, some new network structures 
do not follow the traditional definition, such as streamlined 
protocol stacks to reduce energy consumption, and data 
encryption adopted by secure communications. It has raised the 
interest to exploit potential physical characteristics of radio 
waves for communication security attributes.  
An overview of the low-complexity physical layer security 
protocols for Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices is presented in 
[8]. In [9], traditional security and authentication approaches 
are reviewed. In these traditional authentication methods, the 
core purpose is to determine whether the data are being 
generated and sent by a legitimate user. One of the key methods 
employed to solve such problems is digital signature 
technology. Signature authorization serves as a cornerstone in 
business transactions including the issuance of contracts and 
cheques, without it, business activities will not function 
properly. A forward-looking study in [10], raised the issue as 
one-way authentication and has given directional guidance. 
Certain digital phenomena have similar attributes as 
handwritten signatures [11] and can be used easily to identify 
and determine user authenticity as it cannot be randomly 
generated. This large class of technologies is collectively 
referred as one-way authentication.  
A formulation that extracts useful information from certain 
distortion data set ensuring authentication is a more specific 
solution [9]. Due to the conversion of analog signals to digital 
format, the vast majority of processed information is to some 
extent distortion. The authorization has therefore a very wide 
range of applications in modern electronic systems.  
In this paper, for wireless health monitoring scenarios, a new 
body-centric signature authorization (B-CSAI) scheme that 
meets unconditional and keyless authentication is implemented 
through the time-frequency domain characteristics of the user's 
body center channel. This solution combines the human tissue 
time-frequency domain characteristics with legitimate users. A 
prototype system was also constructed to confirm the 
availability and efficiency of the proposed signature 
authorization scheme. The main advantages of the scheme are: 
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the test frequency bands meet the mainstream 5G definition and 
can be easily applied to 5G terminals; electromagnetic wireless 
devices are equipped with antennas, and the proposed scheme 
has no additional hardware requirements; the natural binding of 
signature authorization data to users has good security 
performance. The main contributions of this paper are as 
follows: 
1) Based on the channel characterization at 27-28 GHz, 
29-30 GHz, and 29-30 GHz, it is verified that the user's 
body-centric channel is subject-specific.  
2) It is confirmed through experiments that the body-centric 
channel characteristics could not be simulated by the attacker, 
which satisfies the optimal conclusion of unconditional keyless 
authorization, and can be used for secure signature 
authorization.  
3) The proposed signature authorization scheme confirms the 
security from the perspective of physical mechanism, which 
can resist active and passive attacks well and has good 
scalability.  
Following the introduction, the paper is divided into five 
parts. Section II reviews related research. Section III describes 
the physical basis of B-CSAI, using radio wave propagation 
and gives details of security scenarios considered. Section IV 
discusses the basic principles of the proposed B-CSAI security 
technique. Section V presents the experimental design, results, 
and analysis. Finally, conclusions are drawn and 
recommendations are given in Section VI. 
II. RELATED WORK 
In this section, it is divided into three parts to introduce the 
conventional security authorization, the millimeter wave 
related physical layer security, and the main concerns of this 
manuscript.  
A. Conventional Security Method 
In previous studies [12], security has traditionally relied on 
encryption in a defined network structure through an isolation 
principle. This kind of mature and large-scale application of 
cryptographic system operation is easy to understand, and if 
deployed correctly, these systems can provide reliable security 
guarantees. But there are always some recognized limitations. 
First of these is the security strength. Such systems usually 
assume that the adversary has only limited computing resources, 
which were true at the information age beginning, however, 
with the advancement of microelectronics, this assumption is 
becoming increasingly unrealistic. Second, the overhead 
generated by the key distribution involved in security. As the 
system becomes larger, improper key management may be 
exposed to social engineering attacks. Although many smart 
physical layer communication process encryption schemes are 
designed, attempt to meet those requirements by the channel 
[11]. However, reliable access to the channel state information 
of both communication parties is always a recognized obstacle.  
In [13], key-based authentication is solved from the 
perspective of privacy-limited registration data. It is assumed 
that the user's measurement during the authentication phase is 
controlled through a cost-limited "action" sequence. The issue 
of identification and certification from the perspective of 
information theory is discussed considering user-generated 
source data, such as biometric data sources. In [14], an adaptive 
positioning fitting model is proposed to effectively deal with 
overlapping fingerprint separations. Retinal image registration 
is crucial for the diagnosis and treatment of various eye 
diseases. Many methods have been developed to solve this 
problem. In [15], a new retinal image registration method has 
been suggested to utilize significant feature areas. However, the 
rapid and accurate recording retinal images is still a challenging 
issue due to low content contrast, large intensity differences, 
and deterioration of unhealthy retinas. In fact, traditional 
biometrics represented by the above fingerprints and irises can 
be well implemented in resource insensitive applications. 
However, there is still an urgent need to explore new biometrics 
in lightweight network architecture.  
B. Physical Layer Security with Radio Wave Propagation 
In [16], the potential application of physical layer security in 
millimeter-wave (mm-wave) ad hoc networks is explored. It is 
being observed that the low transmit power state using a low 
mm-wave frequency can achieve better security performance. 
A transition from low mm-wave frequency to a high mm-wave 
frequency is required to obtain a higher confidentiality rate 
when the transmit power is increased. Because in the case of 
high transmit power, the sensitive high frequency can be more 
effective to facilitate communication establishment in an 
increased path loss state and provide security bits. However, the 
main drawback of security solutions in existing wireless 
communication scenarios, is that they do not take advantage of 
the wireless media characteristics [17]. For example, the 
broadcasting and fading characteristics of a wireless medium 
that brings variation in channel parameters over time, 
frequency, and space.  
In our view, combining wireless authentication with 
confidential communication can partially replace or facilitate 
password peers for more secure communications, at least for 
initial trust. Although physical layer security has attracted 
many research work, health-IoT related authentication 
signatures are still relatively unexplored [17]. As physical layer 
security relies on the radio wave propagation and channel 
characteristics, advances in this area are also vital importance. 
With the continuous advancement in miniaturization of 
electronic devices, wearable computing has been a reality with 
a variety of commercially body-worn devices. Radio wave 
propagation is relatively stationary between basestation with 
mobile terminals [18], but it is highly unstable in on-body or 
body-to-body communication scenarios. 
Studies of channel characteristics and antenna propagation 
performance in the on-body S-band (around 2.45 GHz) link has 
shown that the path loss can vary up to 50 dB due to different 
antenna arrangements and changing body postures [18] [19]. It 
infers that the characterization of radio wave propagation 
should necessarily take into account the changes caused by the 
geometry of local environment. That can also impact the 
antenna input matching and radiation patterns. Wireless 
propagation in body-worn sensors up to X-band frequencies is a 
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well-studied paradigm [20] [21]. However, higher frequencies 
of millimeter wave and sub-millimeter wave, which are fast 
strengthening their claim as one of the key enabling 5G 
technologies, are needed further ascertaining [22].  
C. Threats and Concerns 
Researchers have considered the security challenges faced 
by the four different protocols included in IEEE 802.15.6 [23]. 
That work has clearly shown that the IEEE 802.15.6 standard 
lacks security and suffers from serious signature authentication 
problems. Millimeter waves also exhibit higher free space 
attenuation relative to microwaves [24]. This is an important 
feature as far as security is concerned as it contains the wave 
propagation within the vicinity of the human body and 
minimizes interference with other systems. It makes the 
body-centric loss difficult to be obtained at a distance 
inherently enhancing security attributes. The underlying 
physical layer features have been valued by many researchers 
and are considered as a potential addition/replacement to 
security services in wireless networks. Identity-based attacks 
are thought to be the first step in an intruder's attempt to launch 
various attacks [25]. Signature authorization is an essential part 
of the basic security process and is exactly what the 
body-centric communication needs [26].  
Authorization, authentication, and trust, the process of entity 
identification are prerequisites for authorization. In most 
scenarios, the authorization will not be possible without proper 
authentication, and authentication is essentially based on trust 
[27]. The authors proposed and discussed the authentication in 
body-centric networks in [28]. For a large scale deployment of 
the physical layer security technologies in wearable 
applications, it is necessary to expand our understanding from 
authentication towards authorization. The next section will 
introduce the security significance of radio propagation.  
III. PHYSICAL BASIS OF B-CSAI  
A. Security Potential of Microwave 
The classical monograph urges us to employ more 
open-minded visions to examine the network's security issues 
[29]. Interdisciplinary thinking is not only helpful, it is rather 
indispensable in today's increasingly vulnerable information 
sharing world. Over the past decade, physical layer security 
research has seen unprecedented growth with many promising 
design insights. Most of these solutions are based on wireless 
communication because a large amount of data is transmitted 
over wireless links, which are more exposed to security threats 
as compared to their wired counterparts. In [30], hardware 
resources are considered as a potential information theoretic 
security device, having excellent reliability against strong 
adversary models.  
In [31], an excellent template for body-centric correlation 
channel model study is given, studying numerical 
characterization and link budget assessment of wireless 
implants for different digital human models using multiple 
non-uniform phantoms. It is observed experimentally that the 
antenna pattern strongly depends on the location of wireless 
implants and the body composition of subjects, which makes 
the body-centric communication highly user-specific. The 
understanding is further cemented through the work presented 
in [32] where the authors have characterized the ultra-wideband 
(UWB) wireless channel for medical applications. The 
numerical analysis has revealed the dependence of antenna 
performance and wireless channel characteristics on the gender, 
height, and body mass index of the user. Variation in the path 
loss between different users is reported to be one-fifth of the 
free-space value, which embodies rich features of the 
body-centric communications time-frequency parameters. And 
Fig. 1.  Time frequency characteristics of the millimeter wave wireless link and along with antenna radiation patterns at the three studied frequency bands, (a) 
time-frequency data for subject 1's attempts to sign and authorize in 27-28 GHz band based on three measurements, (b) time-frequency data for subject 1’s attempt 
to sign and authorize in 29-30 GHz band, (c) time-frequency data for subject 1’s attempt to sign and authorize in the 31-32 GHz band, (d-f) radiation patterns of the 
B-CSAI antenna operating in the corresponding frequency band.  
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these characteristics can be utilized effectively as a potentially 
good candidate for biometrics. More extensive, in [33] [34] 
shows the potential security meaning of human electrical 
properties.  
B. Basic of B-CSAI Physical Channel Model 
In our considered application scenario of signature 
authorization (where a human hand and its impact on the 
wireless channel is used as signing and authorization tool), this 
time-frequency characteristic of the human hand is of special 
interest. We have used three mm-wave frequency bands of 
27-28 GHz, 29-30 GHz, and 31-32 GHz in this investigation 
due to growing commercial interest on them. These frequencies 
offer a very high data rate for real-time audio and video 
streaming in 5G and beyond communication paradigms. 
Moreover, shorter wavelengths allow device miniaturization, 
which is vital for body-centric portable/wearable/implantable 
applications. Furthermore, mm-waves interaction with 
biological tissues is also controllable as they reduce both the 
possible health concerns associated with human exposure to 
electromagnetic radiation and can couple enough subject 
feature information.  
Figure 1 presents the time-frequency domain information 
(using S21 (path loss/transmission coefficient)) of one human 
subject's hand in three mm-wave frequency bands. For the sake 
of experimental rigor, radiation patterns of the antenna used in 
the corresponding frequency band are also depicted, in Fig. 
1(d-f). Results for three tests are given to stipulate the idea. The 
results show that good communication links are built on 
creeping waves (which propagate beneath the body surface and 
are very sensitive to surface and near-surface defects) and 
surface waves (which propagates over the human body surface). 
Which are major reasons for B-C communication link changes.  
Figure. 1(a) shows the time-frequency domain 
characteristics in the 27-28 GHz frequency band. The phase of 
the millimeter wave signal varies between -180° to 180° and the 
signal frequency gradually increases from 27 GHz to 28 GHz 
(in 1 MHz step). The quantified data shows very good 
autocorrelation characteristics. A high level of repeatability in 
multiple experimental trials is evident showing satisfactory 
stability of the measurements. The radiation patterns show that 
with increase in the frequency, antenna main beam gradually 
narrows, but there is no obvious distortion. This not only helps 
in the multi-band feature extraction, but also shows that the 
high repeatability observed in Figs. 1(a-c) is indeed caused by 
the subject, not only by the antenna.  
 
To gain further insight into the relationship between path loss 
(S21) and change in the frequency bands, mathematical 
modeling is needed. Path loss is the gradual loss in the energy 
of the wireless signals as they propagate. We considered 
body-centric hand channel can be modeled in terms of path loss 
exponent and shadowing factor through the following 
expression: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )0 10
0




= + +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
    (1) 
 
where ( )0PL d  is the estimated or simulated path loss in the 
distance 0d  between the sending and receiving parties, γ  is 
defined as path loss exponent, ( )0,N σ  is a simplified 
definition of standard deviation (to avoid increased complexity 
of the time-frequency model of B-CSAI and stipulate the 
workability of the proposed technique) where σ  represents 
shadowing factor. The definition of SFσ  is further detailed in 
Fig. 2(a). Equation (1) shows that the channel variation depends 
on γ , ( )0,N σ , and the distance d  for sending and receiving 
signals. The distance of the application scenario is kept 
Fig. 2.  Dependence of path loss on the frequency band, for the considered 
body-centric link (a) mathematical expression and calculated values 
(shadowing factor is represented using standard deviation), (b-d) path loss data 
and linear fit for the three considered frequency bands, respectively. 
Fig. 3.  Path loss of a given test showing the time-frequency relationship between the three frequency bands and the specific correlation coefficient. 
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constant in this work for the sake of simplicity, so the main 
influencing factor is the user's body itself. For example, at 
29-30 GHz, the pathloss exponent is equal to -1.7, and the 
shadowing factor is 0.74 (with 95% confidence bounds).  
The 3-D data of Fig. 1 is shown 2-D space in Fig. 3 (x-axis is 
phase, y-axis is S21). It is clear that in different frequency bands, 
repeated tests by the same subject are highly reproducible. The 
correlation coefficient (CC) shows that the body-centric 
channel induces a hand effect, and repeated experiments 
certainly have distortion, which means biometrics and the 
correlation between distortions are extremely stable. For 
example, in 27-28 GHz band, CC = 0.94 which indicates it is 
nearly consistent. In the other bands, CC changes are minimal 
having fluctuations of the order 0.01. It should also be noted 
that Fig. 3 maps spatial time-frequency features to 2-D planes, 
and the local data point clouds are occluded. This reduces the 
high repeatability of CC, but also shows the richness of raw 
B-CSAI features.  
To further understand the effect of the human hand on the 
path loss at different operating frequencies, let us consider the 












+∑        (2) 
 
where ε∞  is relative permittivity at infinite frequency, pε∆  is 
due to the relative permittivity change caused by Debye pole, 
pτ  is the pole relaxation time. Eq. 2 shows that the dielectric 
constant of the human body is dependent on the frequency of 
the electromagnetic wave. In other words, with the change in 
the electromagnetic wave frequency, the human organs 
composed of similar tissues will exhibit different electric 
properties. Human organs composed of different tissues will 
have different responses even at the same frequency. This 
theoretical derivation is corroborating with the results in Fig. 3 
where the pathloss exponent and shadowing factor of the same 
subject have changed significantly in the three bands while the 
CC is still very high in the same frequency band. This infers 
that raw B-CSAI is a stable approach for the participants 
themselves. Fig. 4 illustrates the experimental data distribution 
from a statistical point of view. It shows that due to the increase 
in frequency, the characteristics of the channel have greatly 
changed, and the received signal is no longer a perfectly normal 
distribution signal. In the lower frequency band (27-28 GHz), 
the probability density function (PDF) curve presents a 
saddle-shaped double peak, mapping to the cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) curve is a more obvious two-phase 
acceleration. In 29-30 GHz, the S21 data is enriched at -26 dB, 
which corresponds to its average value of -26.6 dB, and there is 
also a steeply accelerated section in the CDF curve. At 31-32 
GHz, the data distribution is more uniform and the PDF peak 
appears around -26 dB, which is also consistent with its mean 
value of -25.5 dB. 
Combining communication channel modeling and bornprint 
we know:  
q ( ) ( )
2
2 2
11 221 14sign t rsign




⎛ ⎞= − −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
   (3) 
 
where qsignP  is B-CSAI that passes through the body-centric 
channel, signP  is the signature authorized original signal, tG  
and rG  is the gain on the transmit and receive sides, The 11S  
and 22S  are the reflection coefficients. Combining Eq. 1 and 3, 
we can deduce that:  
 
[ ] [ ] [ ]0 10
Creeping waves Surface waves0




= + + Ψ + Π⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
  (4) 
 
where [ ]dBΨ  represents the creeping wave component and 
[ ]dBΠ  represents the surface wave component. This further 
explains the combined effect of creeping wave and surface 
wave component in the B-CSAI that is statistically reflected in 
Fig. 2(a). Due to microwave modeling of body area network, at 
the microscopic level, the creeping wave propagating is mainly 
in the shallow surface of the body. The surface waves 
collectively carries and couples the user's time-frequency 
characteristics into themselves and become a good source of 
signature authority. Our time-frequency domain body-centric 
signature authorization model is formulated in Eq. 5 and 
illustrated in Fig. 5:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )m mY i i X i i= Ψ +Π       (5) 
 
Fig. 4.  Data feature probability density function (PDF) and probability cumulative distribution function (CDF) for S21 in different frequency bands. 
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where ( )X i  is main B-CSAI channel input, ( )Y i  is the 
signature authorization channel output, ( )m iΨ  and ( )m iΠ  are 
the effects of creeping waves and surface waves, respectively. 
The 1signP , 2signP , signnP  from the user's body are independent 
but identically distributed signatures in the time-frequency 
domain. In formal applications, this type of signal is transmitted 
through coding, and some distortion (such as digital analog 
conversion) occurs. It makes the signal as nX which then 
passes through the body-centric channel composed of nmΨ  
(creeping wave) and nmΠ  (surface wave) components, coupled 
with the body characteristics. At this point, the signal becomes 
nY . A possible decoder will guarantee the establishment of the 
communication itself. A highly abstract logical model will 
include all effects from normal communications to possible 
malicious attacks. The resulting reconstructed signal qsignP  will 
reflect the influence of the body-centric loss. Whether such 
reconstruction can be performed will become a criterion. This 




In the absence of scattering scenes, the de-correlation 
resulting from the natural spatial separation of legitimate users 
and adversary channels may be slower than expected by the 
mathematical model. If there is a Line-of-Sight (LOS) channel, 
then the radio wave will have priority in choosing the mode of 
propagation. From the point of view of communication 
establishment in the weak scattering environment, the 
communication signal quality is more stable and also conforms 
to experimental observation. This is a widely used assumption 
in physical layer security channel key agreement studies. The 
deployment scenario has therefore more complicated 
conditions to help both communicating parties better extract 
secret bits from channel changes. Slightly different in B-CSAI, 
the signature authorization scenario is simple, the stability of 
the LOS channel makes the protocol robust, and the added user 
hand impact introduces a rich channel change adding lots of 
fresh identity features.  
In this section, we started with the microwave security 
potential, established the B-CSAI physical channel model 
according to the classic method of radio wave propagation, and 
explained the principle of signature authorization preliminarily.  
IV. B-CSAI SECURITY PRINCIPLE 
The availability of physical layer security dual-threshold 
algorithm in the health monitoring body-centric network is 
studied in [36]. In [37], a theoretically optimal conclusion is 
given from the information theory point of view, indicating that 
unconditional secure keyless authentication is feasible if and 
only if the legitimate channel for extracting wireless 
fingerprints cannot be simulated by the attacker. In the previous 
section, we have elucidated the principle of B-CSAI wave 
propagation from the perspective of the classical body-centric 
antenna propagation. It includes not only the details of the 
body-centric time-frequency domain, but also the subject's 
specificities. In this section, we will discuss the security 
principles of our solution around the optimal conclusion of 
keyless authentication theory.  
A. B-CSAI Security Background 
The one-way authentication problem was defined in 1976 by 
[10], making it clear that a digital phenomenon with the same 
attributes as a written signature is needed for a secure link. It 
should be easy for anyone to realize that the signature is true, 
but it is impossible for anyone other than the legal signer to 
produce a signature. This is the first time that the signature 
authority has been proposed systematically, according to the 
authors' knowledge. In fact, Shannon's work is more biased 
towards symmetric key cryptography. Perhaps a more relevant 
development is Wyner's work on eavesdropping channel. He 
introduced the idea of providing security through the channel 
itself, rather than the secret shared by both parties.  
 





1 1; log 1
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In a recent landmark development [7], Eq. 6 has been given 
stating that the key rate KR  depends on the transmit power P  
and the coherence time T . It is also concluded that the key 
generation rate increases with increase in the transmit power. 
The coherence time however affects oppositely by reducing the 
key rate when P being increased. It is therefore deduced that 
from the perspective of key generation, a rapidly changing 
channel environment is advantageous, as a slow or almost 
stable channel environment will lead to a slow key generation. 
Discussion in [16] looks at the issue with a different. In the low 
transmit power state, the use of low mm-wave frequencies can 
achieve better security performance. On increasing the transmit 
power, a transition from the low mm-wave frequency to the 
high mm-wave frequency provides higher confidentiality. This 
is also in line with our experimental observations path loss is 
frequency dependent and more sensitive in high frequencies. 
Providing more secure bits needs to be considered when the 
power is increased.  
Many asymmetric encryption schemes have been proposed 
for the one-way authentication problem identified by [10]. 
However, asymmetric cryptography is often considered to 
demanding in terms of processing power [8]. This is not a 
Fig. 5.  (a) B-CSAI system model. The original signal signP  passes through the 
creeping wave nmΨ  and the surface wave 
n
mΠ  channel, and is coupled to the 
body-centric time-frequency characteristics. The resulting qsignP  can be used as 
an authorized signature, (b) B-CSAI attack paradigm. 
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constraint on many occasions, such as desktop computers, but it 
is a serious problem in the increasingly growing wearable 
sensor networks that require low complexity, energy efficiency, 
and scalability.  
The wireless body-centric communication is an open 
property to the wireless medium that makes it easy to be 
intercepted by an attacker or subject to spoofing. However, the 
body-centric fading channel is rich in user time-frequency 
features that introduce uncertainty and can contribute well to 
security. The standard layering method has many shortcomings, 
therefore, in order to guarantee the authenticity and 
confidentiality of wireless data transmission need physical 
layer security [17]. Traditional password security is based on 
the eavesdropper's lack of computing resources and ability to 
successfully attack the system. Moreover, the overhead 
associated with key management and distribution is huge. 
Wireless body area network IEEE 802.15.6 standard aims to 
provide confidentiality, authentication, and privacy for the user. 
However, according to the protocol analysis in [23], the 
researchers are failed to find any instructions to ensure that this 
standard can provide the required security functions. In [17] a 
keyless authentication is proposed. In such a keyless scheme, 
certain characteristics of a particular channel between sending 
devices or legitimate users are utilized in order to authenticate 
the transmission. In particular, features are identified using the 
initial trusted transmission and then detected during the next 
transmission. Some of the authors’ related health monitoring 
initial trust work can be seen in [36].  
B. B-CSAI Security Analysis 
A theoretical optimal solution is proposed in [38], which 
quantifies the necessary conditions for feasibility of 
certification to both parties. It shows that secure authentication 
is possible when the legitimate transmitter noise channel and 
receiver behavior cannot be completely simulated by the 
attacker. An interesting conclusion from the research on the 
statistical model of the body-centric channel is also useful [28] 
[39]. One type of uncertainty occurs in the actual measurement 
of the body center, due to changes in the radiation pattern of the 
transmitting and receiving antennas in the human body vicinity. 
In Fig. 5, when there are no pre-shared keys for legitimate 
parties making 0kR = , signature is totally completed by the 
body-centric channel ( ),Sign Y= Ψ Π . Security authorization 
is only possible if the attacker is not able to completely simulate 
the body-centric channel n nZ Y≡/ . Whilst the attacker cannot 
fully simulate the time-frequency characteristics of the copied 
body-centric channel. Thus, B-CSAI satisfy the secure 
certification requirements even from the strictest information 
theory point of view.  
 
q ( )( ) ( ), signsignH P Y H PΨ Π =       (7) 
 
From Eq. 7 and Fig. 5, we can see that the body-centric 
signature's main variable depends upon ( ),Ψ Π , creeping wave 
Ψ  and surface wave Π  components. In this mm-wave 
time-frequency domain study, we are concerned with the 
B-CSAI having a wavelength of 11.1mm (@27 GHz) to 9.4mm 
(@32 GHz). The human body's influence is huge due to its 
comparatively very large electrical size. Even the hands, which 
are focus on this study, will impact the path loss exponent and 
shadowing factor greatly due to its large size.  
Fig. 6 shows the apparent pathloss exponent and shadowing 
factor observation (First measurement data of three 
participants). There is a clear degree of change in either the 
time domain (S21) or the frequency domain (phase). Sufficient 
body-centric related feature information is effectively extracted. 
The use of B-CSAI for signature authorization is similar to 
writing with different handwriting styles during a real time 
communication. In the experiment, the subjects are all bare 
handed to replicate real life scenarios. Gloves will change the 
channel response due to change in the electric properties of the 
human hand and hence, would be easily traceable.  
More generally, positive trends can be seen in MAC address 
randomization in 802.11 systems, but physical layer security 
design in the more emerging 5G systems and future 802.11 
(ai/aq/ax) has not yet been introduced [40]. In fact, the physical 
layer security technology with broad space will further 
consolidate the classic security. We can say that B-CSAI based 
on the time-frequency characteristics of the body centric can be 
used as an alternative to a solid, effective signature 
authorization guarantee.  
 
In [41], link signature explores the use of rich channel 
characteristics, but the uncontrolled nature of the wireless 
environment can lead to loopholes. For example, the widely 
used assumption that the half-wavelength region is sufficient to 
remove the coupling between the attacker and the legitimate 
user. If the assumption failure, which can impact significantly 
in some studies. More specifically, the widely used half 
wavelength decorrelation assumption is established in a 
scattering-rich environment. From another point of view, this 
may be a problem for key agreement, but it is an advantage for 
signature authorization, which means more stable features, and 
the time-frequency characteristics of B-CSAI are mainly 
derived from the controllable user's hand palm. In the related 
work [39], the researchers have recommended careful 
investigation of the channel correlation in deployment 
environment, which has been done in Sections III. The same 
Fig. 6.  Time-frequency characteristics of B-CSAI small sample. 
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attention was paid to the work [42] that brought security 
enhancements from keystroke, and a careful examination of the 
possible authentication schemes for keystroke habits. It is a 
very interesting conclusion that the mobile device relies on the 
authentication scheme implemented by the key dynamics. The 
security performance is limited and it is not recommended to 
use at its own. Also, that keystrokes are biological 
characteristics of certain behavioral attributes but are not 
combined with intrinsic attributes of users, making the coupling 
with subjects rather weak. On the other hand, our proposed 
B-CSAI scheme is closely related to the composition of the 
user's hand (dielectric properties), which can effectively 
improve security.  
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION 
In this section, a detailed experimental implementation, 
comprehensive data acquisition, and analysis are presented to 
measure the efficacy of the proposed B-CSAI scheme.  
A. Experimental Setup 
 
The measurement set-up for the body-centric channel 
observation is illustrated in Fig. 7. An Agilent E8363 Vector 
Network Analyzer is used to acquire frequency-domain data in 
multiple frequency bands (27-28 GHz, 29-30 GHz, and 31-32 
GHz). In the middle of the receiving and sending channel, the 
human subject's right hand acts as the main scattering source. 
Although we only considered the right hand of the users, this 
approach is equally applicable to the left hand due to symmetry 
of the shapes and tissue properties. A total of 6 healthy 
volunteers participated in the experiment (including 5 males 
and 1 female, aged 25 to 30 years), and the main body local 
channel hand palm length ranged from 16 cm to 22 cm with an 
average of 19 cm. It is worth noting that as the initial 
confirmation of bornprint, it is appropriate to set a smaller 
number of subjects. Expanding the number of experimental 
samples will be carried out in further work. The signal received 
at the receiving port passes through the body-centric wireless 
channel coupling with hand's signature.  
The Fig. 7 also illustrates potential contribution of the 
surface wave nmΠ  and the creeping wave 
n
mΨ  components. 
For a very large number of application scenarios, the signature 
authorization system always has great interest in those 
characteristics, which can always generate reconstruction by 
itself properties. However, it is obvious that the quality of 
certification itself will be degraded as a result of continuous 
processing to content. Due to device dependencies, RF 
fingerprinting is a known and static input/output characteristic 
of the transmitter's RF chain, independent of time factors such 
as user's location, or channel propagation characteristics [37]. 
These are different from wireless channel based fingerprints. 
The channel fingerprint is a random mapping that does not 
depend on the transmitter characteristics and depends on the 
user's location and channel propagation characteristics. 
Therefore, wireless channel based authentication systems 
requires a strong premise assumption that users will remain 
stable, which makes them unsuitable in many practical 
situations. Undoubtedly, both two approaches have their own 
weaknesses, and the collection of physical features is expected 
to complement them well. It is to verify this theoretical 
derivation, we have designed and implemented experiments.  
B. Data and Statistics 
 
 
Fig. 7.  Schematic diagram of body-centric time-frequency feature acquisition. 
The VNA is equipped with horn antennas to generate a directional beam to 
irradiate the hand palm, and obtains the B-CSAI original data, which 
containing rich feature information. Fig. 8.  Frequency and time domain data of multiple subjects in the 27-28 GHz 
band with 5 experiments (subject 1 test 1-5 from top to bottom according to 
arrows). 
Fig. 9.  Frequency and time domain data of multiple subjects in the 29-30 GHz 
band with 5 experiments (subject 1 test 1-5 from top to bottom according to 
arrows). 




Fig. 8 shows the B-CSAI data for the six subjects in the 
27-28 GHz band (subject 1 is at the top of the Y-axis). The data 
has been uniformly dimensioned and S21 is displayed in the 
same color gamut. Obviously, the basic strength has been 
greatly differentiated by the naked eye. In each row, 50 sample 
points are extracted with excellent reproducibility, both in the 
frequency domain and the time domain. 
It is evident from Fig. 9 that high frequency (29-30 GHz) 
brings better discrimination between different subjects. More 
detailed points are coupled by the electromagnetic wave to be 
represented (a more subdivided detail change occurs compared 
to the small or similar color segments in Fig. 8). Fig. 10, using 
the highest frequency band (31-32 GHz), observation with even 
richer details is made. The gamut distribution is also the widest 
(color bar).  
 
TABLE I 
NET BODY LOSS IN MULTI-BAND B-CSAI 
 
The net body loss, referred here as the B-CSAI radiation 
efficiency can be calculated from the total radiated power for 
the source in free-space (simulated or calculated by empirical 
formula) FSP  and enable B CSAIP −  in the body-centric network. 
Due to the gain of creeping and surface waves, the net body loss 
in practice will change, compared with free space. Therefore, 








=           (8) 
 
Table I shows that the calculated net body loss η from the 
Eq. 8 for the multi-band B-CSAI. The data has a high degree of 
autocorrelation for the same subject. For example, the first 
dataset for 27-28 GHz showing 5 tests of subject 1, net body 
loss is maintained at -25.1 dB. In the same frequency band, 
different subjects also have very good distinguishability, which 
is consistent with the time-frequency domain visualization 
diagrams in Figs. 8-10. It is numerical evidence of B-CSAI 
signature authorization good properties.  
 
TABLE II 
PATHLOSS EXPONENT AND SHADOWING FACTOR VALUES FOR 
DIFFERENT MULTI-BAND B-CSAI SUBJECTS 
 
Table II summarizes the path loss exponent and shadowing 
factor values for five independent signatures from six subjects. 
It can be seen that the six datasets for the same frequency band 
have good distinguishability. The two parameters also exhibits 
a good level of robustness and repeatability. Across the 
different frequency bands, the difference between the subjects 
is very obvious. From the sample statistics shown in Table II, it 
can be established that the shadowing factor of the same subject 
has a strong stability attribute. This has been theoretically 
illustrated in Fig. 2 of the Section III. The dispersion degree of 
the data itself is highly dependent on the subject's impact on the 
body-centric channel in terms of nmΨ  and 
n
mΠ .  
C. Security Evaluation 
As a natural extension, the attack paradigm to the B-CSAI is 
analyzed as shown in Fig. 5(b). Attackers can launch active 
attacks through two types of channels, similar device attacks 
from the source of the wireless signal, and disguised attacks 
from the time-frequency characteristics of the subject's physical 
Fig. 10.  Frequency and time domain data of multiple subjects in the 31-32 GHz 
band with 5 experiments (subject 1 test 1-5 from top to bottom according to 
arrows). 
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center. For similar device attacks, an attacker cannot obtain a 
terminal device used by a legitimate user, and can only generate 
signP  signal using the same type or similar hardware and 
perform subsequent attacks accordingly. For the disguised 
attack, the attacker may obtain legitimate equipment (social 
engineering attack, etc.), and only need to simulate the B-CSAI 
primary channel to perform the attack, such as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )e eZ i i X i i= Ψ +Π         (9) 
 
For similar device attacks that require a high level of 
technology, an attacker could use RF signal waveform 
generator to simulate the B-CSAI feature or simply use the 
SDR as a generic platform to emulate a legal terminal device. 
Such attacks are often tentative, due to the enormous workload 
that scans and attempts to identify vulnerable nodes for more 
targeted intrusions. The signal acquired at this time is not 
( )X i , but is defined by the attacker. At this point, due to the 
double security standards of the possession (legal terminal 
equipment) and time-frequency characteristics of the physical 
center (hand palm), the attack cannot be established. The 
signature generated by the attacker cannot achieve 
authorization. For a more threatening disguised attack, the 
attacker may obtain signP  or the encoded output 
nX . At this 
time, the security based on the possession has been breached. In 
reality, due to the lost device, this scenario is entirely possible. 
Our B-CSAI time-frequency information now plays a key role. 
Because the body-centric loss that is closely coupled with the 
skin, fat, and muscles of the user's hand, from Eq. 5, the 
attacker cannot construct a suitable prosthesis, and therefore 
cannot implement forged signatures. For passive attacks, due to 
the high path loss in millimeter wave band (as shown in Table II) 
and the body-centric channel specificity, the attacker cannot 
monitor and obtain signature authorization features.  
From the Section III single trial experiment and the Section 
IV security discussion, it is known that secure signature 
authorization is feasible if and only if the legitimate transmitter 
noise channel and receiver behavior cannot be fully simulated 
by the attacker. The presented analysis of time-frequency 
domain characteristics to the B-CSAI, fully satisfies this strict 
requirement from the perspective of information theory. 
B-CSAI also offers low complexity, energy efficiency, and 
scalability, these can equally be efficient in other paradigms of 
the wireless communication systems may all suitable. It is also 
effective in anti downgrade attacks due to the user specific 
physical attributes, as 2G-5G coexists for a long time and there 
are unknown security risks.  
Radiometric fingerprinting is a recently explored technique 
that uniquely identifies wireless devices [25]. The basic 
assumption of a radiation fingerprinting based security scheme 
is that the unique characteristics of hardware cannot be copied 
or copied from one device to another, just as it is impossible to 
replicate human nature/behavior. The advantages of the 
solution are obvious. This type of signature scheme uses 
inherent hardware flaw features. It is difficult to deceive 
signatures by using off-the-shelf wireless devices. However, 
the disadvantages are also obvious. The signature scheme from 
radiation measurement can be used to simulate and replay 
attacks if the attacker is more powerful. Specifically, if an 
attacker is equipped with a software defined radio or high-end 
RF waveform generator, it can simulate radiation 
characteristics. In addition, such schemes are only applicable to 
static situations, meaning that signal properties can be reliably 
extracted without being affected by other factors such as 
mobility or interference.  
The time-frequency characteristics of the body-centric 
channel and the nature of the dielectric structure of the 
individual person increase the degree of isolation at the time of 
signature authorization effectively. Hardware-based security 
solutions can always suffer higher-level technical threats, but 
combining the essential characteristics of the human body can 
effectively overcome this hidden danger. Regarding the 
moving situation, such problems do exist at low frequencies 
such as the S band, due to the characteristics of the radio wave 
propagation. The B-CSAI implements signatures for hand-held 
cellphone scenes at high frequencies for 5G and beyond 
applications. The length of 11.1mm (27 GHz) to 9.4mm (32 
GHz) is also a fist-long even if it is expanded ten times. In fact, 
the above experiments did not require the subjects to remain 
still. Fig. 8-10 and Tables I-II confirm the robustness of the 
scheme.  
Another common problem with existing physical layer 
signature schemes requires expensive RF analyzers to map and 
verify radiometric signatures. The widespread deployment of 
expensive vector network analyzers in unsafe and harsh 
physical environments is not feasible. There have been 
gratifying advances to deal with this problem though. Liu et al. 
[43] have implemented a practical Ka-band antenna-in-package 
structure and discussed the antenna element design and 
implementation tradeoffs. High-frequency antenna packages 
and radio wave transceivers are optimized, at the same time. 
More specifically, Gu et al. [44] have produced an organic 
based multi-layered phased-array antenna package in 28 GHz 
for 5G radio access applications. These industrial advances and 
device miniaturization have eliminated technical obstacles to 
the B-CSAI practical application in near-future applications. 
However, more practical scenarios would be considered in our 
following studies to explore the full potential of this scheme. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A new body-centric time-frequency signature authorization 
technique for health monitoring B-CSAI has been proposed, 
and validated by radio wave propagation model and security 
analysis. The identity-based attacks are considered to be the 
first step in an intruder's attempt to launch various attacks. 
From the information theory view, theoretical discussions 
suggest that secure certification is possible when the behavior 
of the legitimate transmitter cannot be completely simulated by 
the attacker. It is shown through detailed experimental 
observations of physical centric wave modeling that 
body-centric radiation performances are subject-specific. 
Although the fading curve of the channel magnitude statistical 
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perspective can be obtained, each user's unique time-frequency 
domain variation cannot be simulated and replicated by others. 
This is due to the contribution of creeping waves and surface 
waves over the human body that would be highly dependent on 
the shape and composition of the body tissues. Hence, distinct 
for each user which undoubtedly satisfies the basic condition of 
the security signature and shows that our proposed B-CSAI 
have great potential, especially for IEEE 802.15.6 protocol with 
extremely high security risk.  
A detailed measurement campaign is carried out to evaluate 
the performance of time-frequency channel response and 
radiation efficiency, employing 6 human subjects. The 
statistical analysis has shown that the proposed technique offers 
a high degree of correlation within the same frequency band 
(with a difference of the order 0.01) and exhibits excellent 
repeatability. This research just presented initial results as a 
proof of concept. To obtain a generalized path loss probability 
security model, it is necessary to provide different people with 
accurate link budget assessments. A thorough investigation of 
changes in body shape and clothing path loss will be carried out 
as an extension of this study. We have not seen publications 
dealing with this issue, so we cannot give a comparative 
analysis of performance. Finally, although the security 
necessary conditions are not falsifiable, further studies are 
always necessary.  
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